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ABSTRACT
Identity fraud (IDF) may be de¯ned informally as exploita-
tion of credential information using some form of imper-
sonation or misrepresentation of identity, in the context of
transactions. Thus, IDF may be viewed as a combination of
two old problems: user authentication and transaction au-
thorization. We propose an innovative approach to detect
IDF attempts, by combining av-certi¯cates (digitally-signed
audiovisual recordings in which users identify themselves)
with av-signatures (audiovisual recordings showing users'
explicit consent for unique transaction details). Av- cer-
ti¯cates may be used in on-site transactions, to con¯rm user
identity. In the case of remote (e.g. web-based) transactions,
both av-certi¯cates and av-signatures may be used to au-
thenticate users and verify their consent for transaction de-
tails. Conventional impersonation attacks, whereby creden-
tials (e.g. passwords, biometrics, or signing keys) are used
without the consent of their legitimate users, fail against
VideoTicket. The proposed solution assumes that identity
thieves have access to such credentials.
1. INTRODUCTION
Identity fraud (IDF) may be de¯ned informally as exploita-
tion of credential information using some form of imperson-
ation or misrepresentation of identity. Javelin Strategy &
Research reported that, in 2005, 8.9M American adults be-
came IDF victims [35]. On average, each of these victims
was defrauded $6,383, and spent 40 hours to resolve their
IDF problem. 47% of IDF cases were detected by victims
themselves. We seek to present a method that helps de-
tect IDF attempts. Throughout the paper, we use the term
transaction to denote any interaction involving two or more
parties, and resulting in the issuing of credential tokens (e.g.
credit or health cards), access to services (e.g. health care)
or goods (e.g. software programs, groceries, etc), and/or ¯-
nancial transfers. We use the expression remote transaction
to refer to transactions involving at least one remote (e.g.
c °ACM (2007). This is the authors’ version (October 2007) of this work.
It is posted here by permission of ACM for your personal use. Not for
redistribution. The of￿cial version was published in the Proceedings of the
2007 New Security Paradigms Workshop (NSPW), which was held in Sept.
2007, in White Mountain, New Hampshire, USA.
web-based) party, at transaction time. Transactions that
are not remote are said to be on-site.
Few generic IDF detection systems (i.e. IDF detection sys-
tems that can simultaneously be used for remote and on-
site transactions, regardless of applications
1) have been pro-
posed in the academic literature. Application-speci¯c IDF
detection methods (such as phishing and key-logging coun-
termeasures [3, 7, 16, 21, 39]) are known, but we seek to
design a generic method, which we expect to be more con-
venient and less expensive for end-users, when considered
across applications. We also seek to design an IDF detec-
tion method that combines user authentication (since IDF
deals with the fraudulent use of identity) and transaction
authorization (since IDF consists in exploiting credential in-
formation in the context of transactions). Furthermore, we
aim at designing a method that does not rely on credentials
which can be used fraudulently, i.e. without their legitimate
users' explicit consent for speci¯c transaction details. This is
a limitation of digitized handwritten signatures, passwords,
secret keys, digital signatures, message authentication codes,
keys derived from ¯ngerprints, and statements certifying de-
vice locations. Contrary to most proposals, we assume iden-
tity thieves (already or will) have access to such user secrets,
and propose a method to detect IDF despite this assumption
[18].
Overview of Proposed Scheme. We propose an IDF de-
tection scheme using audiovisual recordings (av-recordings)
to simultaneously authenticate users and authorize transac-
tions. At system setup, each user is issued an audiovisual
certi¯cate (av-certi¯cate), i.e. a data structure composed of:
(1) a list of privileges granted to the av-certi¯cate's legiti-
mate holder; (2) an av-recording in which this user shows
her face, and identi¯es herself (e.g. through spoken words);
and (3) a digital signature over (1) and (2) computed by
a trusted authorized party. At each transaction, the user's
av-certi¯cate is combined both with transaction details, and
a freshly generated av-signature (i.e. av-recording in which
the user conveys consent for these transaction details); we
call the combined data structure an audiovisual ticket (av-
ticket). This av-ticket is sent (e.g. via the web) to a relying
party (e.g. a credit card issuing company). The relying party
(or a delegate thereof) examines the av-ticket by verifying
the following four criteria: (a) the associated av-signature
1e.g. credit card payments, border control, health care pro-
vision control, etc.includes all transaction details included in the av-ticket;
(b) the associated av-certi¯cate indicates that its legitimate
holder has all privileges required for the given transaction;
(c) the digital signature included in the av-certi¯cate is that
of a trusted and authorized party; and (d) the person shown
on the av-certi¯cate's av-recording appears (with a reason-
able level of certainty) to be the same as that shown on the
av-signature. If these four criteria are met, the transaction
associated with the examined av-ticket is authorized. In the
case of on-site transactions, only av-certi¯cates are needed
(to verify users' identity); in the case of remote transactions,
both av-certi¯cates and av-signatures are used (in the form
of av-tickets), to authenticate users and con¯rm their con-
sent for transaction details. In either case, the proposed
scheme may be used for a chosen class of transactions, e.g.
card issuing and high-value transactions.
The proposed scheme (called VideoTicket) combines user
authentication and transaction authorization, enables on-
site (hence decentralized) veri¯cation, can be used for both
remote and on-site transactions, and is suitable for multiple
classes of applications (see Section 2.4). VideoTicket has
lighter security requirements than user-based digital signa-
tures (users need no signing keys; hence user-based signing
keys need not be protected). To avoid replay attacks or use
of av-signatures for unintended purposes, VideoTicket also
uses unique transaction details (e.g. by including a transac-
tion's date/time or unique transaction identi¯er generated
by a transaction authorizing party). It can therefore be
viewed as the combination of (facial, voice, and/or gesture)
biometrics and a challenge-response protocol between users
and transaction authorizing parties. VideoTicket is not re-
silient to certain classes of av-recording forgery (see Sec-
tion 3), but makes such both forgery user- and transaction-
speci¯c, and thereby less scalable for IDF in comparison
to classes of IDF committed with reusable credential (e.g.
credit card) information (obtained, e.g., via mass database
compromise). VideoTicket might require human-based ver-
i¯cation of av-recordings. In the case of on-site transactions,
this human-based veri¯cation consists in verifying users' av-
certi¯cates, in the same way clients' handwritten signatures
are theoretically veri¯ed by cashiers using the back-side of
credit cards.
In summary, we propose a generic method to detect IDF
attempts by examining and comparing audiovisual record-
ings of users. VideoTicket captures users' biometric iden-
tity and consent for transaction details; hence, imperson-
ation attacks, whereby credentials are used (potentially mul-
tiple times) without their legitimate users' consent, do not
work. VideoTicket assumes that identity thieves have ac-
cess to such credentials. We report on our early-prototype
partial implementation of VideoTicket. Our work raises
interesting questions for biometric research, e.g. the possi-
bility of fully-automated multi-modal biometric authentica-
tion schemes combining gesture analysis with face and voice
recognition. We wish to stimulate research on the automata-
bility and commercial viability of schemes like VideoTicket
with present or emerging technologies.
Outline. Section 2 describes the proposed scheme and ap-
plications thereof. Section 3 discusses various aspects of
VideoTicket, including detection e®ectiveness, ¯nancial and
time cost, on-site veri¯ability, scalability, privacy implica-
tions, manageability, security requirements, convenience of
use, and veri¯cation outsourcing capability. Section 4 re-
ports on and presents lessons learned from a partial proto-
type of VideoTicket. Section 5 reviews related work. Sec-
tion 6 concludes.
2. VIDEOTICKET PROTOCOL
This section describes VideoTicket, a generic method to de-
tect IDF attempts by comparing av-recordings. Section 2.1
lists parties involved in the scheme. Sections 2.2 and 2.3
present the two main protocols, namely Setup and Transac-
tion. Section 2.4 describes practical potential applications
using variants of VideoTicket (including, notably, a proto-
col employing av-certi¯cates and audiovisual calls to con¯rm
user identity and consent for transaction details).
2.1 Parties Involved
VideoTicket involves four main parties denoted U, R, V ,
and B (see Fig. 1). U is a legitimate system user who car-
ries a general-purpose storage device dU (e.g. a °ash drive,
magnetic-stripe or smart card, or cell phone) used to store
credential information allowing credential relying parties to
determine whether U has a claimed identity (ID) and set of
privileges. U must be able to: (1) obtain and understand
transaction details presented to her;
2 (2) show her face and
express her will before a camera and microphone (e.g. us-
ing words or hand signs); and (3) execute other computer-
oriented transaction-related tasks such as card swiping (in
the case of on-site transactions), web-browsing, keyboard
typing, and mouse pointing and clicking (in the case of re-
mote transactions). R is a credential relying party (e.g. a
building entrance control o±ce, credit or student card issu-
ing o±ce, web-based merchant or service provider, or on-site
point of sale). V is a party on which R relies
3 to verify users'
claimed identities and privileges, and B is a party that is-
sues av-certi¯cates to users so that they prove their claims
of ID and possession of privileges. For example, B = R = V
could be a government agency (or credit card company) that
reviews online applications to issue health cards (or credit
cards); each online card application could include an av-
ticket. (Section 2.4 outlines more detailed application sce-
narios.) U, R, V , and B may have various trust relation-
ships. In Section 3.1.2, we identify several such relationships,
and discuss their impact on the security guarantees provided
by VideoTicket.
2.2 Setup Protocol
Public Key Setup. B generates for itself a signature-
related public-private key pair (eB;dB), and V obtains an
authentic copy of eB. If R 6= V , R and V may also obtain
authentic copies of each other's signature and encryption-
related public keys to realize authenticated, con¯dentiality-
protected, and integrity-protected communication channels
between
them.
2This may involve using PC keyboard, mouse, and monitor.
3In some instantiations, V and R may be collocated or the
same entity. A single V may be relied upon by multiple
credential relying parties.Figure 1: VideoTicket Protocol Overview
Replay-Protection Setup. V creates a table EV (used in
Step 4 of Section 2.3) to detect replay attacks. EV contains
identity and transaction authorization information processed
by V within the last ¢V time units (e.g. 2 hours).
Maximal Transaction Duration Setup. R sets an upper
bound to the processing time of each user transaction, by
initializing ¢trans (e.g. setting ¢trans = 5 minutes).
Credential Information Setup. To obtain an av-certi¯cate
from B, U interacts with B as follows.
1. U goes to B in person, and requests from B all pieces
of ID and privilege-related credential information she
is entitled to receive from B.
2. B ensures that U is who she claims to be (e.g. via a pre-
determined out-of-band procedure involving presenta-
tion of identity-related cards issued by trusted parties,
and con¯rmation of information found on these cards
through phone call to their issuers). Then, the follow-
ing takes place.
(a) B assigns to U a permanent identi¯er IDU, and,
if U has privileges ¼1 through ¼n (where n is a
positive integer such as 10), B forms the sequence
(ID¼1;¢¢¢ ;ID¼n) of privilege identi¯ers.
4 B also
associates with this n-tuple the pair (IDB;`), where:
IDB is a permanent identi¯er of B assigned by
a trusted naming authority and used to obtain
(e.g. through a web query) an authentic copy of
eB; and ` is a string encoding ¼i's validity time
interval (for i = 1;¢¢¢ ;n), and a description of
both h and a public-key signature scheme with
associated key size (e.g. 2048-bit RSA-PSS).
(b) B records a short (e.g. 15-second) audiovisual se-
quence rU in which U shows her face (as for pass-
port photos, but under multiple viewing angles),
and identi¯es herself. To identify herself, U may
speak a few sentences,
5 use hand signs, and/or
demonstrate a physical token showing identi¯ca-
tion information. In the latter case, the token
must be su±ciently large to be examined by V
without zoom. U may identify herself using a
4The concatenation of bit strings x and y is \x;y" or (x;y).
5For instance, U could say: \This is Joe Morning, customer
at BestBank, at 12:30, on July 13th, 2006, in Boston."
veronym (i.e. identi¯er revealing U's identity), or
pseudonym assigned by B. The image and sound
quality of rU should be su±ciently high for software-
assisted human veri¯ers employed by V to deter-
mine whether rU is a montage of (shorter) audio-
visual clips, or the person in rU is not the same
person as that appearing in another speci¯ed au-
diovisual clip (see Step 4 of Section 2.3). rU must
also be recorded with adequate equipment (e.g. a
noise-canceling microphone, and light-and-color-
adjusting video camera), in a partially-controlled
environment (e.g. suitably-lit private o±ce, or semi-
closed booth located in a public area).
(c) B uses dB to compute bU = ([h(rU);IDU;`]dB;
[h(rU);IDU;`;ID¼1]dB;¢¢¢ ;[h(rU);IDU;`;
ID¼n]dB).
6
(d) B forms U's av-certi¯cate cU = (IDU;`;rU;ID¼1;
¢¢¢ ;ID¼n;bU;IDB), and has cU be stored on dU
(e.g. by obtaining dU from U, and storing cU
thereon; or by sending cU to dU via Bluetooth or
SMS). cU is thereby stored on dU, and U obtains
dU.
2.3 Transaction Protocol
Suppose now that a user U wants to interact, through a
transaction T, with a party R, to access a set S of services
or resources. Suppose also that, to do so, R requires U
to have privileges ¼1 through ¼n, and assume that R, U,
and V refer to S using the string identi¯er IDS. For R
to determine whether U's claims of ID and possession of
privileges are valid, U, R, and V proceed as follows.
1. At time tstart, R generates and gives to U a string
¿ encoding unique and partially unpredictable trans-
action details associated with T. For instance, let ¿
consist of a dollar value, R's identi¯er and geographic
location, tstart, and a transaction identi¯er uniformly
chosen at random by R from a su±ciently large set
of easy-to-pronounce-or-read words (e.g. ZIP or postal
codes), or easy-to-reproduce gestures.
2. U gives the av-certi¯cate cU to R, via a communication
channel providing stream-integrity and con¯dentiality
protection, and enabling authentication of R by U.
7
6[x]dB is the digital signature on string x using key dB.
7Such a channel may be instantiated using SSL with server3. Let sT be an av-signature of T by U, i.e. an av-
recording in which U shows her face and shows consent
for the information encoded in ¿. Consent for ¿'s de-
tails can be demonstrated through spoken words, hand
signs, or showing of information printed on, or elec-
tronically displayed by a physical token (e.g. a small
movable monitor attached to a kiosk supervised by
R). sT is assumed to have su±ciently high image
and sound quality to enable software-assisted human
veri¯ers employed by V to determine whether sT is
a montage of shorter av-recordings, or the person ap-
pearing in sT is not the same as that appearing in
rU. sT must also be recorded with adequate equip-
ment (e.g. a noise-canceling microphone, and light-
and-color-adjusting video camera), in a partially- con-
trolled environment (e.g. suitably-lit private o±ce, or
semi-closed booth located in a public area). To im-
prove the veri¯ability of sT, U may be asked to posi-
tion her head in front of a video camera in such a way
that her face appears in a box displayed on a screen;
the dimension of this box may be chosen so that rel-
evant features of U's face can be discerned by sT's
veri¯er. Either R records sT, or sT is recorded with
a microphone and camera-enabled device (e.g. a lap-
top PC or cell phone) used by U. In the latter case,
U's device sends sT to R through a communication
channel providing stream-integrity and con¯dentiality
protection.
4. R forms (pT;IDS), where pT = (¿;sT;cU) is an av-
ticket. If V 6= R, R then sends (pT;IDS) to V via a
communication channel providing mutual authentica-
tion, and stream-integrity and con¯dentiality protec-
tion.
5. If V 6= R, V checks whether EV has an entry contain-
ing ¿, and if so, V noti¯es R that pT has already been
processed by V . If V = R, V stores pT in EV ,
8 and
uses a software-assisted person, to check whether:
C1. sT does not appear to be a montage of av-recordings,
which can be checked by seeking abrupt changes
in objects' (e.g. lips or hands) movements, light
contrast, image color, sound pitch, or sound vol-
ume;
C2. the person appearing in sT is the same as that
appearing in rU;
C3. consent for all elements of ¿ that make T unique
and unpredictable (with respect to any other trans-
action) is shown in sT; this may involve examina-
tion of speech, hand movements, and/or informa-
tion appearing on a physical token shown by the
person appearing on sT;
C4. information encoded in (¿;bU) and independently
veri¯able by V (e.g. current time,
9 R's identi¯er,
and inclusion of current time in bU's validity pe-
riod) is accurate;
authentication (in the case of online transactions), or the
physical insertion of a token (storing cU) in a trusted input
device controlled by R (in the case of on-site transactions).
8Recall that EV stores values temporarily. V removes all
entries of EV that have been stored for ¢V time units or
more.
9Some accuracy level (e.g. a 5-minute window) of time syn-
chrony between U, R, and V is hereby assumed.
C5. the n+1 components of bU are valid signatures by
B on (h(rU);IDU;`), and (h(rU);IDU;`;ID¼1)
through (h(rU);IDU;`;ID¼n) respectively;
10 and
C6. the tuple (ID¼1;¢¢¢ ;ID¼n) includes the identi-
¯ers of all privileges required to access S.
If conditions C1 through C6 are met, V sets aT = 1
to indicate that the person M who presented cU has
identity IDU and possesses all privileges required to
access S. Otherwise, V sets aT = 0 to indicate that
some of conditions C1 through C6 are not met, or
M is an impersonator of U (i.e. the user of identity
IDU). V also sets eT to be a short constant string
disregarded if aT = 1, and specifying which conditions
are not met and what could be done by U, if aT = 0.
If V 6= R, V then sends (aT;eT;h(pT)) to R via a com-
munication channel providing mutual authentication,
stream-integrity and con¯dentiality protection.
6. If V 6= R, R uses h(pT) (given (aT;eT;h(pT))) to as-
sociate aT with pT. Let tend be the time at which R
receives aT. If tend ¡ tstart > ¢trans or aT = 0, R
rejects T, and sends to U a transaction receipt zT in-
cluding sT and a short constant string indicating the
reason why T was rejected (e.g. a description of eT
concatenated with a note indicating that T's process-
ing duration was too long). If, on the other hand,
aT = 1, then R authorizes T and sends to U a trans-
action receipt zT including sT.
11 If T is an on-site
transaction, R may also print and give to U a partial
transaction receipt (e.g. a portion of zT excluding sT).
2.4 Practical Application Scenarios
VideoTicket may be used for various practical applications
including driver's license, health-care or credit card issuing,
¯nancial transaction approval, and customer authentication
for remote assistance.
In the case of driver's license and health card issuing,
VideoTicket could be used with B = R = V being a gov-
ernment agency that issues health cards (HCs) or drivers'
licences (DLs). Legitimate HC or DL holders may be re-
quired to obtain a new card every t (e.g. t = 5) years, either
at designated o±ces, or via the web. In the former case,
av-certi¯cates may be used to con¯rm applicants' identity;
in the other case, av-certi¯cates may be combined with av-
signatures, to authenticate applicants and con¯rm their will
to be issued a new card.
Another way to use VideoTicket is to let R = V be a com-
pany that issues credit cards after having veri¯ed av-tickets
sent by applicants via the web. The av-tickets may need to
be issued by select (trusted) banks, credit card companies,
or government agencies.
10While veri¯cation of n + 1 signatures is more com-
putationally intensive than veri¯cation of a single
signature on (h(rU);IDU;`) and a combination of
(h(rU);IDU;`;ID¼i)'s, the former saves space in bU by re-
moving the need to include, in bU, a large number of signa-
tures by B on (h(rU);IDU;`) and all possible combinations
of (h(rU);IDU;`;ID¼i)'s.
11zT may be sent to an email or other address speci¯ed by U
in Step 1 of the Transaction protocol. The address may be
used only once to obtain zT, or multiple times for interac-
tions with R or certain classes of credential relying parties.VideoTicket may also be used as follows: R is a web mer-
chant, and B = V is a credit card company. To detect
credit-card-based forms of IDF, B could require that se-
lect transactions (e.g. high-value, international, or postdated
fund transfers) need the presentation of av-tickets.
Note that av-tickets may be presented to V as explained in
Section 2.3, or in a variant protocol whereby av-signatures
are requested by V directly from U, under chosen circum-
stances (e.g. for high-value transactions). For example, U
may carry a camera-phone enabling audiovisual calls. Sup-
pose U wants to make an expensive purchase from R over
the web. U could ¯ll an associated web form, and send
her av-certi¯cate with this form to R. R would delegate the
transaction request to V (as explained in Section 2.3). Then,
in order to con¯rm U's identity and consent for the trans-
action, V could call U (using information extracted from
U's av-certi¯cate), and engage in an audiovisual call with
the person answering the call. In such a case, the audiovi-
sual call would play the role of the av-signature described in
Section 2.3.
Another way to use VideoTicket is to let B = R = V be a
company (e.g. bank, Internet service provider, or large cor-
poration) that wants to o®er remote assistance (e.g. ¯nancial
advice or computer support) to its customers/employees.
To do so, each customer/employee U of B obtains an av-
certi¯cate from B, via a registration procedure. To authen-
ticate its customers, R = B then deploys a secure web-based
audiovisual chat-like application that provides a con¯dential
communication channel between U and R. When U seeks as-
sistance from R, U interacts with R via the aforementioned
web application, and V = R authenticates U by obtaining
(from U or a trusted database) U's av-certi¯cate. V may ask
U multiple authenticating questions (as in the case of com-
monplace telephone assistance), but these questions may be
partially replaced by audiovisual evidence which R obtains
by downloading U's av-certi¯cate. In the latter case, the
time required by R to authenticate U may be shortened,
thereby improving both U's experience and R's (time and
¯nancial) e±ciency at providing remote assistance.
We emphasize that, for each application, VideoTicket may
be used for a chosen class of transactions, e.g. card issuing
and high-value transactions.
3. DISCUSSION OF VIDEOTICKET
In this section, we discuss the security and several other
aspects of VideoTicket, including scalability, privacy impli-
cations, convenience of use, and ¯nancial and time cost. We
also discuss the automatability of the proposed scheme.
3.1 Security Discussion
3.1.1 Threat Model
We consider a number of goals and techniques ID fraud-
sters may respectively have and employ to attack practical
instantiations of VideoTicket. While not exhaustive, these
goals and techniques are meant to abstract a number of re-
alistic practical threats. We do not aim to mathematically
prove the security of VideoTicket; it partially relies on the
reliability of human analysis and comparison of audiovisual
recordings. We use the notation of Section 2 to enable more
precise discussion.
Adversarial Goals. In practical instantiations of
VideoTicket, IDF may take multiple forms depending on
system applications (e.g. on-site debit card payment, online
issuing of credit cards, on-site access to medical services,
or on-site border control). Here, we abstract four goals ID
fraudsters may have when they attack our scheme. ID fraud-
sters may seek to: (G1) gain money (or credits correspond-
ing to money); (G2) gain access to digital or physical services
or resources without paying; (G3) preserve their anonymity
when accessing physical or digital services or resources; (G4)
frame legitimate users (e.g. by discrediting or blackmailing
them).
Adversarial Techniques. To impersonate a legitimate
user U of VideoTicket, an ID fraudster A may use several
techniques, including the following (and their combinations).
T1. Forgery of Identity Claim (e.g. Audiovisual
Recording). A may attempt to forge an audiovisual
sequence ^ vT in which a person appearing to be U shows
her face and speaks the information encoded in forged
transaction details ^ ¿ which U does not show explicit
consent for. If A also obtains the credential informa-
tion cU of U, then A may be able to impersonate U,
by sending ^ pT = (^ ¿; ^ vT;cU;IDS) to R.
T2. Forgery of Identity Proof's (e.g. av-Certi¯cate's)
Digital Signature. A may attempt to forge signa-
tures issued by B, e.g. by obtaining a copy of dB, or
using a weakness in the associated signature scheme.
This can be used in either of the following scenarios:
(a) If A is able to forge a signature of B on (h(rA);IDU;
`), and (h(rA);IDU;`;ID¼1) through (h(rA);IDU;
`;ID¼n), where rA is an av-recording analogous
to rU but showing A, then A can access S with-
out having the required legitimate ID or privi-
leges. This is done by sending (^ pT;IDS) to R,
where: ^ pT = (^ ¿; ^ sT;sA); ^ ¿ are transaction de-
tails potentially unknown to U, but agreed upon
by A and R; ^ sT is an av-recording in which A
shows her face and explicit consent for ^ ¿; sA =
(IDU;`;rA;ID¼1;¢¢¢ ;ID¼n;bA;IDB); and bA =
([h(rA);IDU;`]dB;[h(rA);IDU;`;ID¼1]dB;¢¢¢ ;
[h(rA);IDU;`;ID¼n]dB).
(b) If A = U and U does not have a privilege ¼n+1
(identi¯ed by ID¼n+1) needed to access a service
or resource o®ered by R, then A may proceed as
follows, if she is able to forge a signature of B on
(h(rU);IDU;`;ID¼n+1): A uses [h(rU);IDU;`;
ID¼n+1]dB as a forged proof that she has privilege
¼n+1 and V (logically but illegitimately) indicates
to R to A has ¼n+1.
T3. Dishonest Veri¯cation. A may attempt to cause
V (or an employee of V ) to improperly verify and/or
compare av-recordings or digital signatures included in
av-signatures and av-certi¯cates, by issuing an illegit-
imate value of aT. This would achieve the same result
as T5(c), T5(d), or T5(e), but without impersonating
V .T4. Imitation of Legitimate User. A may attempt to
dress, make up, and speak like U in such a way that V
(or an employee of V ) cannot distinguish A from U.
T5. Coercion of Legitimate User. A may attempt to
coerce U into generating a valid av-signature by show-
ing forced consent for transaction details chosen by
A; A could then reuse this av-signature and U's av-
certi¯cate to generate a valid av-ticket.
T6. Impersonation of Relying Party (e.g. through
Phishing). A may attempt to impersonate R using
the following techniques:
(a) A impersonates R in such a way that U interacts
with R believing that A is R (as in the case of
phishing attacks). A can thereby use the creden-
tial information provided by U to access resources
or services requested by U.
(b) A impersonates R in such a way that V believes
that A is R (assuming, of course, that R 6= V ).
In this case, A either: (i) learns the value of aT;
or (ii) is able to make V believe that U interacts
with R (while, in fact, it is not the case).
T7. Impersonation of Verifying Party. A may at-
tempt to impersonate V in such a way that R interacts
with A believing that A is V . A can thereby:
(a) use the credential information provided by R to
access resources or services requested by U;
(b) learn the value of pT, thereby compromising the
privacy of U;
(c) illegitimately deny or grant U access to certain
resources or services;
(d) issue an illegitimate value of aT to deny R the
privilege of granting certain resources or services
to U (e.g. to reduce R's market share, and poten-
tially increase that of other relying parties trust-
ing V ).
(e) issue an illegitimate value of aT to illegitimately
in°uence R to grant a known impersonator of U
access to certain resources or services.
T8. Reusable User Credential Theft/Cloning. A may
attempt to steal (or clone and return) U's reusable cre-
dentials (e.g. av-certi¯cate). This does not su±ce to
generate valid av-signatures (hence av-tickets) in U's
name.
T9. PC-based Keyboard Logging. A may attempt to
surreptitiously record credential information typed by
U using a user PC's keyboard. This does not su±ce to
generate valid av-signatures (hence av-tickets) in U's
name.
T10. PC-based Screen Logging. A may attempt to sur-
reptitiously record all information seen by U on a user
PC's monitor (including, e.g., opened windows, mouse
movements, and mouse clicks). This does not su±ce to
generate valid av-signatures (hence av-tickets) in U's
name.
T11. Replay of Identity Claim (e.g. Audiovisual
Recording). A may attempt to replay a valid au-
diovisual sequence sT in which U shows her face and
explicit consent for transaction details ¿. Such a replay
would, however, be detected by V using EV .
3.1.2 Threat Discussion
Considering the aforementioned threats and the fact that
knowledge of text-based credential information (e.g. pass-
words) does not su±ce to generate av-tickets on behalf of
users (and thereby impersonate these users), we conclude
that VideoTicket is resilient to ¯ve main classes of attacks:
(R1) theft and cloning of av-certi¯cates and user personal
devices; (R2) PC-based keyboard logging; (R3) PC-based
screen logging; (R4) replay of av-signatures; (R5) and network-
based capture of userids and passwords (e.g. through phish-
ing). In addition, we conclude from T1-T5 that VideoTicket
detects IDF attempts when the following conditions are met:
(D1) av-signatures are not undetectably forged;
12 (D2) B's
digital signature is not forged;
13 (D3) V accurately veri¯es
digital signatures or av-recordings; (D4) A is not able to
successfully appear to be U, e.g. by dressing, looking, and
speaking like U; (D5) U is not coerced into generating a
correct av-signature against her will.
A might be discouraged from attempting to forge av-recordings
because it may be practically infeasible to generate these
automatically, or to reuse them for multiple transactions
or users. (This contrasts with other classes of authenti-
cation or transaction authorization credential information,
such as textual/graphical passwords, credit card numbers, or
driver's license numbers.) Moreover, attacks based on the
forgery of av-recordings may work in remote transactions
(since neither R nor V see A), but may be di±cult to carry
in the case of on-site transactions (especially if R veri¯es
the av-certi¯cate of A). VideoTicket also uses di±cult-to-
predict transaction identi¯ers in order to increase the di±-
cult of successful av-recording forgery.
In some applications (e.g. debit or credit card transactions,
and driver's license-based ID veri¯cation), B may be as-
sumed to: (1) honestly attempt to detect IDF; (2) be able
to protect the con¯dentiality of its signing keys; (3) and use
practically unforgeable digital signature algorithms. Given
these assumptions, the remaining issues are whether: (a)
V accurately veri¯es digital signatures and av-recordings;
(b) U can be imitated by A; and (c) U can be coerced. If
V = B (as in the case of health and debit card transac-
tions), D3 may be assumed. Note, however, that the e®ec-
tiveness of humans at verifying av-recordings may decrease
after a number of consecutive work hours. We encourage
further research on this topic. An interesting question is
whether U can be imitated by A in such a way that V can-
not distinguish av-recordings of U and A. For instance: is
it possible for A to go, in person, to R, provide a copy of
U's av-certi¯cate, and make V = R believe that A = U?
VideoTicket does not counter such attacks. Neither does
VideoTicket counter attacks whereby U is coerced into gen-
erating valid av-signatures against her will.
3.2 Other Practical Considerations
On-Site Veri¯ability, Scalability, and Privacy. The
proposed scheme is designed in such a way that av-tickets
12It is assumed that A is not able to forge audiovisual clips in
which chosen victims speak chosen transaction details, with
chosen voice characteristics, and in such a way that lips and
face movements are convincingly synchronized with speech.
13VideoTicket does not rely on end-users' digital signatures.can be veri¯ed on-site by credential relying parties.
14 This
allows not only for a decentralized (hence more scalable)
system with no single (veri¯cation) point-of-failure, but also
for improved user privacy, since, for each user U, the scheme
does not require a single (ID and privilege veri¯cation) party
to track all of U's transactions. U must, however, show
her face on av-signatures and av-certi¯cates' av-recordings;
this can be perceived as privacy invasive. VideoTicket is
therefore not suitable for anonymous transaction approval;
we focus on applications such as border control, and
credit/health/identity card issuing and renewal, which often
are non-anonymous.
Manageability and Security Requirements. VideoTic-
ket does not employ user-speci¯c signing keys; this implies
that users do not need to generate (signature-related) public-
private keys pairs, regularly request certi¯cation of public
keys, and safeguard the privacy of private keys. Moreover,
no infrastructure and processes are needed to revoke, an-
nounce the revocation, and request the revocation status
of user-speci¯c signing keys. Consequently, VideoTicket
avoids known practical roadblocks of (large-scale) public key
infrastructures.
Convenience for End-Users. Let T be a transaction oc-
curring at time t, between a user U and a credential relying
party R, located at a location L. If U speci¯es T's iden-
ti¯er when sT is recorded, then this identi¯er need not be
unique with respect to R, but to t, L and T's identi¯er. Con-
sequently, T's identi¯er may be a positive integer smaller
than q (q ¸ 1), if R is engaged in q simultaneous transac-
tions at time t. However, in order for T's identi¯er to be
unpredictable, it ought to be chosen uniformly at random
in a su±ciently large set (e.g. the set of 7-letter lower-case
words composed of roman letters, which has a cardinality
of about 8 billions). User studies are needed to determine
how much time is required, in practice, by users to produce
good-quality av-recordings under various conditions.
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Veri¯cation Outsourcing Capability. V may out-source
(i.e. delegate to a trusted party) its veri¯cation responsibil-
ities (e.g. for increased cost e±ciency). This, however, may
introduce privacy concerns, when delegate veri¯ers have ac-
cess to users' transaction details.
Financial and Time Costs of Human Veri¯cation.
The ¯nancial cost of av-recording veri¯cation by humans
is potentially low: 60 online transaction veri¯cations per
hour, performed by an employee paid $12 per hour, grossly
costs 50 cents per veri¯cation;
16 for on-site transactions in
which V = R, 1-minute veri¯cation of a user's ID may be
14On-site veri¯cation here implies credential relying parties
need not interact with any remote parties at transaction
time.
15We envision the use of VideoTicket with a small number of
recording devices per user, e.g. one camera-phone and one
or two PCs.
16Av-ticket veri¯cation outsourcing may considerably reduce
this estimate (e.g. by an order of magnitude). Several other
factors (e.g. cost of equipment, sta® training, facilities, and
web or phone-based user assistance) should be considered
for a complete cost analysis.
too long, but 30 seconds may be acceptable for some appli-
cations (e.g. credit, debit, health or student card issuing).
The use of VideoTicket could be restricted to transactions
whose non-careful examination could lead to costly iden-
tity theft. For example, card issuing transactions ought to
be carefully examined since identity theft committed with
cards whose existence is unknown to their legitimate own-
ers can be di±cult to detect. Depending on the time taken
in practice to verify av-signature, VideoTicket may not be
suitable for classes of transactions such as last minute bid
on eBay.
3.3 Automated Biometric Veri￿cation
Section 2 presents a version of VideoTicket designed to use
human agents to verify av-recordings. Here, we discuss what
may be more interesting for commercial practice (if feasible):
the use of automated biometric technologies for verifying av-
recordings. Biometric systems allow automatic identi¯ca-
tion or identity veri¯cation of individuals using behavioral
or physiological characteristics [42]. VideoTicket can be
classi¯ed as a biometric veri¯cation scheme, whereby sys-
tem users assert an identity that needs to be veri¯ed. This
di®ers from biometric identi¯cation in which the identity
of an unknown person is sought through examination of a
potentially large list of system user records. Biometric ver-
i¯cation systems are commonly evaluated using their false
acceptance rate (FAR) and false rejection rate (FRR), as well
as their failure to enroll (FTE) and failure to acquire (FTA)
rates [22] (see also [5] Chap. 10). The FTE and FTA rates
are typically most a®ected by user training. For example, in
a face recognition system, users who position themselves in-
correctly before a camera, or in poorly-lit environment, may
not be processed successfully due to the generation of FTE
or FTA events at enrollment and processing time respec-
tively. Once the biometric system has successfully captured
and segmented the features (in this case, the face) from the
image, a match score is generated, which is related to the
likelihood of a match between the person in the live image
and the enrolled image. The match score is compared with
a threshold to make a match decision. The choice of the
threshold a®ects the compromise between FAR and FRR.
Either error rate may be made arbitrarily low at the ex-
pense of the other. Increased false acceptance typically leads
to increased ¯nancial loss and decreased security,
17 while in-
creased false rejection typically leads to increased user frus-
tration and decreased usability. For this reason commercial
biometric systems typically choose a threshold designed to
minimize the FRR at a chosen acceptable FAR.
Biometric data captured by VideoTicket potentially pro-
vides a rich source of biometric information, some of which
(e.g. facial and voice information) can be processed using
available technologies, and some of which (e.g. gesture in-
formation) is the object of current research. VideoTicket
might be extendable to a biometric processing system based
on biometric fusion [38], i.e. the combination of multiple bio-
metric features (e.g. face and voice information) into a single
signal. Biometric fusion often provides improved error rates,
when compared with systems processing (associated) single
biometrics.
18
17More impersonators are susceptible to be falsely accepted.
18Fusing unreliable biometrics into a single system does makeBiometric data captured by VideoTicket could be used for:
1. Face Recognition from Still Images. Face recognition
from still images is one of the most well understood
biometric modalities (coming second after ¯ngerprint
recognition, in terms of maturity of the industry [44]).
Many large scale tests of face recognition performance
have been conducted, such as the FERET [31], FRGC
[33] and FRVT [30, 32] series of tests. Face recognition
performance has shown continuing improvements over
the past 10 years [1], and recent tests indicate that
automated face recognition algorithm performance is
sometimes equal to or better than that of untrained
human evaluators [1, 28, 32].
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Face recognition performance depends on the quality
and size of input images [30]. The FRVT 2006 ana-
lyzed face recognition performance for very high, high,
and low resolution images. The low resolution images
correspond closely to the requirements of VideoTicket
{ 75 pixels between the centers of the eyes. This
results in an (JPEG format) image ¯le size of 10k.
The error rates for low-resolution still face recognition
with controlled pose and illumination are FRR= 2:39%
at FAR= 1%. While these results are promising for
VideoTicket, they assume controlled pose and illumi-
nation. These assumptions may not be realistic for
VideoTicket applications. Hence, lower error rates are
expected in practical settings where user pose and il-
lumination are not controlled.
2. Speaker and Speech Recognition. Speaker recognition is
the automatic veri¯cation of a speaker's identity from
a voice recording of this speaker. Speaker recogni-
tion di®ers from speech recognition in that the for-
mer seeks the identity of the speaker, while the latter
seeks to understand what she says [36]. Both types
of recognition can be used for VideoTicket: the for-
mer for user authentication, and the latter to verify
users'consent to given transaction details. Speaker
recognition is sometimes divided into two categories
[2]: 1) text dependent recognition, in which case the
user is tested against a speci¯c enrolled passphrase,
and 2) text independent recognition, in which case
the user is identi¯ed using di®erent spoken words than
those used during enrollment. The quantity of speech
recording used for speaker recognition varies between
these categories; text dependent recognition typically
uses a passphrase of a few seconds, while text indepen-
dent recognition can use minutes of voice data. Data
captured by VideoTicket might be used for a form
of speaker recognition lying between text-dependent
and independent recognition. We are not aware of
other speaker or speech recognition applications de-
signed with requirements similar to those of VideoTicket,
and wish to stimulate research on these requirements.
Many large scale tests of speaker recognition perfor-
mance have been conducted by NIST; the most re-
cent report [23] indicates continual improvement of
the combined system more reliable than the individual bio-
metrics. We envision the fusion of multiple reliable biomet-
rics capturing several classes of user features.
19Note that VideoTicket, as described in Section 2, assumes
the use of trained human veri¯ers.
speaker recognition performance over the test years
(1996{2003), with an achieved FRR of about 13% at
FAR= 1% (for cellular telephone recordings).
3. Face Recognition from Video. Face recognition from
video is a research area that has not yet seen the sys-
tematic testing observed for face recognition based on
still face images. Video-based face recognition typ-
ically involves the analysis of video clips to identify
high-quality image frames [24]. These frames are typi-
cally extracted, and passed to face recognition software
which processes them.
Another approach is to use the video data to build
a parameterized face model [20, 45]. A concern with
this approach is that the computational work required
to build such models from video data may not be sus-
tained by currently-available user PCs (e.g. for prepro-
cessing on the user's side) [20, 45].
4. Lip Movement, Speech and Gesture Matching. Other
biometric features captured by VideoTicket are lip
movements, speech and face gestures. The analysis
of these features may be used to better protect against
attacks whereby a fraudulent voice signal is associated
with a legitimate video clip. Previous work has exam-
ined the possibility of synthesizing lip movements from
speech data and models, e.g. for computer graphics ap-
plications [34]. Lip-movement-to-speech matching has
been proposed for use in liveness detection [40], and as
a technique to enhance speech recognition [12, 43]. Lit-
tle research appears to have focused on lip-movement-
to-speech matching for biometric veri¯cation. We en-
courage further work in this direction.
It is di±cult to obtain direct price estimates on the use of
biometrics to extend a system like VideoTicket, e.g. because
most face recognition vendors do not currently make pricing
information publicly available. Our informal inquiries indi-
cate that, after a biometric system has been built, the cost
of each transaction (over a 3 year period) might be below 5
cents. Thus, an automated extension of VideoTicket might
provide ¯nancial cost bene¯ts over the system described in
Section 2 (cf. our discussion above on VideoTicket's ¯nan-
cial requirements).
Based on the above review of biometrics research (as it ap-
plies to VideoTicket), we wish to stimulate research and
obtain feedback on the viability of an automated extension
of VideoTicket for commercial use. To this end, our initial
impression is that, while recent advances in face recogni-
tion are promising, more research is needed to deal with the
analysis of user statements of consent to transaction details.
4. EARLY PROTOTYPE REPORT
In order to partially demonstrate the feasibility of VideoTicket,
we built a software prototype. Section 4.1 provides an overview
of the prototype software. Section 4.2 presents lessons learned
from our prototype implementation.
4.1 Implementation Overview
Our prototype consists of three software modules: the issu-
ing module, the transaction request module, and the ver-
i¯cation module. The issuing module (see Fig. 2 on theleft) is meant to be used by B to issue av-certi¯cates for
users who appear before B in person. This module provides
an interface enabling B's operator to view and authenti-
cate (through automated digital signature veri¯cation) an
av-certi¯cate presented by U as a proof of ID. The transac-
tion request module (see Fig. 2 on the right) enables its user
to record an av-signature, input textual transaction details,
specify the location of an av-certi¯cate, and send the associ-
ated av-ticket via email to a speci¯ed address. Finally, the
veri¯cation module (see Fig. 4) enables a veri¯er to review
the two av-recordings of an av-ticket (with respect to given
textual transaction details). This last module may also be
used to approve or reject a transaction request and send the
associated transaction status to a speci¯ed email address.
The prototype was built in Java, using the Java Media Frame-
work (providing audiovisual recording and playing capabili-
ties), and the Java Mail API and Java Activation Framework
(providing email processing capabilities). The user interface
was done using the Swing API. 1024-bit DSA with SHA-1
was used for cryptographic operations (using the Java se-
curity API). Audiovisual recordings were generated using a
16-bit stereo linear track at 44.1 KHz sampling rate, and a
CINEPAK video codec [41] with 320x240 JPEG frames, at
a rate of 15 per second. The total code size (for the three
modules) is 144Kb. The CPU requirements of cryptographic
and av-recording operations were too small to be noticed by
humans. However, the sending of email on a 2.8GHz P4
PC running Windows XP with 1Gb of RAM took around
10 seconds when two 15-second av-recordings (taking about
2.8Mb each) were sent as email attachments.
4.2 Lessons Learned
Implementing a prototype of VideoTicket helped us identify
user interface features that might lead to security-oriented
errors if not implemented adequately. These features and
associated security errors are presented and brie°y discussed
below, in the form of lessons learned from our prototype
implementation.
L1. Distinguish av-Certi¯cate Veri¯cation from av-
Recording Comparison and Comparison of av-
Signature and Transaction Details. Since the cor-
rect veri¯cation of transaction requests depends on the
correct completion of these three tasks, they should be
visually distinguishable by av-ticket veri¯ers. For ex-
ample, av-ticket veri¯ers could be required to check
a box associated with each task, and then press a
transaction approval decision button enabled only if
the three previous tasks have been completed.
L2. Provide Intelligible Transaction Details. Av-ticket
veri¯ers must compare textual transaction details with
transaction details speci¯ed in av-signatures; other-
wise, attackers may use av-signatures for unintended
transactions. Transaction details should therefore be
clearly presented (e.g. using adequate fonts) in identi-
¯ed classes of credential information (e.g. Issuer:MyBank;
Shop:MyStore; etc).
L3. Provide Means to Review av-Recordings E±-
ciently. If av-ticket veri¯ers are not able to e±ciently
review av-recordings (e.g. using functionalities such as
volume up/down, pause, play, fast forward, rewind,
and stop), they may not detect forgery attempts of
av-signatures.
L4. Allow Undo of Transaction Request Approvals.
Since people make mistakes (e.g. when unintention-
ally approving transaction requests), av-ticket veri¯ers
should be able to undo (within a prede¯ned context,
e.g. time period) their approval of transaction requests.
Our early-prototype lacks many of these security-oriented
user interface recommendations. The prototype was meant
to be an early proof-of-concept of the client end.
5. RELATED WORK
Maurer [25, 26] proposes the concept of digital declarations
for court resolution of disputes over user liabilities in (high-
value) digital contracts. The idea is that each user digitally
signs, in addition to a digital contract, a digital recording
of a conscious act related to the contract, in order to show
user consent. If a user U denies a party C's claim that U
has consented to a digital contract d, U goes to court, and
requests that C presents: (a) a digital recording showing
U's consent for d; (b) a valid digital signature b of d; (c)
physical evidence (e.g., paper-based documents signed by a
person whom trusted experts say is U) of U's commitment
to honor contracts digitally signed with the key associated
with that used to verify b. In contrast, VideoTicket is con-
cerned with real-time (potentially independent) veri¯cation
of users' identities and consent for on-site and remote trans-
actions associated with low and high currency values, and
authorized by arbitrary credential relying parties (including,
but not limited to court judges). Moreover, VideoTicket
does not primarily rely on cryptographic techniques to ver-
ify user commitments. (In particular, it does not use user-
speci¯c signing keys and the associated management and
public-key infrastructures and processes.)
Mobiqa [27] proposes a scheme whereby barcodes displayed
by user-held mobile phones are used to verify users' claims
of identity and possession of privileges. Suppose that a user
U wants to obtain a privilege ¼ from a party B, then U goes
to see B in person, B takes a still digital picture of U, and
sends to U's mobile phone (via SMS) a barcode that encodes
an identi¯er IDU. Assume also (without loss of generality),
that ¼ grants U access to a concert. Then U goes to the
entrance gate of the concert, at the appropriate time, and
shows her mobile phone displaying the aforementioned bar-
code to the gate controller G. G scans the barcode, and
uses the corresponding identi¯er ID to: (1) obtain, from a
database controlled by B, a still photo; (2) obtain privileges
associated with ID, and verify that they authorize access to
the concert; and (3) verify that the still photo obtained from
B's database is a photo of the person showing the phone. G
then lets U in, if and only if these three conditions are met.
In contrast, VideoTicket uses av-recordings instead of still
pictures (i.e. richer identifying information); utilizes trusted
digital signatures to allow third parties to independently ver-
ify user ID; and handles both on-site and remote access to
services or resources, through the use of transaction details
combined with av-recordings of users' consent for speci¯c
transaction details.
The SecurePhone project [14] aims to design and implementFigure 2: Issuing Module.
With the issuing module, the user reviews and veri¯es a given av-certi¯cate, records an av-recording,
and issues a new av-certi¯cate.
Figure 3: Transaction Request Module.
With the transaction request module, the user records an av-signature, inputs transaction details, selects an av-certi¯cate,
and sends an associated av-ticket via email.
Figure 4: Veri¯cation module.
User veri¯es av-certi¯cate and av-signature associated with given av-ticket.a mobile communication system enabling users to perform
legally-binding transactions during cell phone-based conver-
sations. To achieve this, users are ¯rst authenticated by
their phones, using a (local or remote) multi-modal biomet-
ric veri¯er that examines users' facial, voice, and digitized
signature. Each authenticated user U is then given access
to cryptographic services provided by her phone's SIM card.
Then, these services are employed to issue user-speci¯c digi-
tal signatures, and thereby facilitate legally-binding transac-
tions between U and other biometrically-authenticated users
talking with U over a phone channel. Unlike VideoTicket,
the SecurePhone project therefore relies on the following: a
large-scale PKI with user-speci¯c signing keys and related
(deployment, maintenance, revocation, and revocation no-
ti¯cation) infrastructure and processes; user-speci¯c digital
signatures (for non-repudiation); non-human-based (user-to-
phone) authentication; and phone-based conversations with
no visual (face) presentation of communicating parties.
Koreman et al. [17] report on an 84-subject experimental
evaluation of a multi-modal biometric technique authenti-
cating users who read prompts into a camera and micro-
phone, and script sign on a touch screen. This technique is
reported to have 0.8% equal error rate; the statistical con¯-
dence level of this ¯gure is not provided. Karam et al. [13]
describe a method allowing an impostor to guide, in real-
time, the facial movements and speech of a synthetic face
mimicking a chosen person of whom su±cient audiovisual
information has been collected in advance. This imposture
method is reported to have a 26% equal error rate with 2%
of statistical uncertainty. The e®ectiveness of each imper-
sonation instance is determined by an algorithm whose em-
pirical e®ectiveness is currently being studied. It therefore
remains unclear whether the proposed imposture method
would e®ectively fool a human veri¯er (e.g. one used in an
instantiation of VideoTicket).
Gentry et al. [10] propose a general framework for using dis-
tributed online human communities to solve problems that
are di±cult to solve by computers and easier to solve by
humans. Av-ticket veri¯cation may fall into this class of
problems. If so, VideoTicket can be viewed as a scheme us-
ing an instance of the general concept of distributed human
computation.
Cyphermint [6] proposes an authentication scheme whereby:
each user U goes to a trusted kiosk R; R takes a still picture
of U, and sends this picture to a back-end server V oper-
ated by a human veri¯er; the veri¯er compares this photo
to another picture provided by U in a preliminary regis-
tration phase; if the two photos match, the human veri¯er
authenticates U, and V authorizes U to perform ¯nancial
transactions at R. In contrast, VideoTicket uses audio-
visual recordings, simultaneously performs user authentica-
tion and transaction authorization, and can be used both
for remote and on-site transactions (since it does not rely
on trusted user terminals).
Choudhury et al. [4] described an algorithm for person ver-
i¯cation from audiovisual clips, which achieved 100% veri¯-
cation rate on real-time input from 26 users. In 2000, Matas
et al. [8] reported on a person veri¯cation contest using still
pictures, audio sequences, and video clips from 295 users;
the best algorithm in this contest achieved false rejection
rates of 2.5% and .8% for false acceptance rates of 2.3% and
46% respectively.
Previous work comparing automated and human person ver-
i¯cation includes: models of strategies used by people to rec-
ognize and process faces [9, 11, 29, 37]; evaluation of super-
market cashiers'performance at identifying shoppers from
photos on credit cards [15]; evaluation of people's ability to
match poor-quality video footage against high-quality pho-
tographs [19]; and comparison of human vs. automatic face
recognition based on still photos [1].
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND
DISCUSSION POINTS FOR NSPW
This paper focuses on identity fraud detection in both re-
mote and on-site transactions, regardless of applications.
The IDF detection proposal can be seen as a novel alter-
native to digital signatures. Av-signatures may be seen as
analogous to digital signatures, and av-certi¯cates as anal-
ogous to public-key certi¯cates. As a comparison, digital
signature veri¯cation typically involves two steps: (1) signa-
ture correctness veri¯cation with respect to a certi¯ed public
key (this is similar to av-signature transaction detail veri¯-
cation and comparison with a certi¯ed av-recording); and
(2) public-key certi¯cate trust veri¯cation (which is similar
to av-certi¯cate trust veri¯cation).
We wish to stimulate research on other non-cryptographic
and cryptographic techniques combining user authentication
with transaction authorization. An open question is whether
it is possible to build a reliable IDF detection scheme that
combines these two security goals while hiding the face and
voice of legitimate users (e.g. for improved user privacy).
Another open question is whether it is possible, given su±-
cient audiovisual information on a real person, to animate,
in real-time, a virtual upper body that speaks, and moves
its face and hands like that person, in such a way that
the virtual person is indistinguishable from the real one by
trained human veri¯ers. Technology enabling such imper-
sonation could be used to forge av-signatures. Another re-
search direction stemming from our work is the design of
fully-automated multi-modal biometric schemes combining
hand signs, with other biometric features such as face and
voice. We are not aware that such schemes exist; they would
help automate transaction request veri¯cation in the context
of VideoTicket. This may reduce the temporal and ¯nancial
cost of transaction veri¯cation in VideoTicket, and lower
the risks of insider attacks whereby transaction requests that
should be rejected are approved.
Automated multi-modal biometric schemes may combine
face veri¯cation of still pictures (extracted from av-signatures)
with speech veri¯cation of audio clips (extracted from the
same av-signatures). An open question is whether the res-
olution of still pictures used for face veri¯cation could be
made su±ciently high in practice to provide low false ac-
ceptance and rejection rates. One may also consider using
a system whereby human veri¯ers review av-signatures re-
jected by an automated biometric subsystem. Such a hy-
brid system could provide cost bene¯ts (due to the use of
automated veri¯cation), while maintaining a desired level ofdetection e®ectiveness (gained from human veri¯cation).
Another open question is whether is whether trained humans
can perform better than automated schemes at recognizing
people from speech or multi-modal biometric features. With
respect to this point, we wish to stimulate research on the
need for user studies involving both human attackers at-
tempting to impersonate legitimate users, and human veri-
¯ers adequately compensated for discovering impersonators.
We also wish to stimulate research on the long-term value
of the "human-authenticating-human" approach to user au-
thentication.
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